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 4 
Introduction 
 
The number of women in parliaments and legislatures across the globe has nearly 
doubled in the last ten years. What happens when more women enter politics, and what impact 
does that have on the lives of female constituents? Drawing on substantive representation theory, 
many claim that women are the best at representing women. Previous literature also suggests that 
although there is no critical mass of women required in a legislature to enact change, increasing 
the percentage of women can make it easier for female legislators to put women’s issues on the 
agenda.  
This project applies the current body of Western-centric literature to Latin America, 
where women’s advancement is met with resistance from machismo culture, and has been 
historically encumbered by authoritarian regimes and imperialism. Through case studies focused 
on Argentina, Costa Rica, The Dominican Republic, Chile, and Uruguay, I explore the legislative 
effects of increased female representation in Latin America. This project aims to answer 
numerous questions regarding female representation, including: Does having more women in the 
legislature lead to the passage of more laws related to women’s interest? Do these laws become 
more meaningful as the number of women increases? And does the influence of female 
legislators extend beyond the legislature and into other areas of government?  
Finally, I take into account the numerous other factors that affect the advancement of 
women’s rights and female-centric legislation — previous literature has established that the 
support of left-leaning parties, well-funded bureaucratic agencies in charge of women’s affairs, 
and women’s movements are three factors that play a vital role in the passage of legislation 
related to women’s issues. Are these factors more important that the descriptive representation of 
women?  
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In other words, do women advance women, or is the formula for increasing women-
centric legislation far more complicating than electing more female legislators? 
 
 
Chapter One: Substantive Representation and Critical Mass Theory 
 
 
There is a great deal of prior research on how to advance female political participation 
and representation. However, the research on results of women’s advancement in politics is 
lacking. Specifically, once women are in positions of power, what impact does it have on the 
lives of female constituents? Will female legislators propose and pass bills related to women’s 
interests? And if so, will they be able to pass more legislation related to women’s interests as 
they become a larger minority in the legislature? So far, the existing body of research on these 
topics has been contradictory. In addition, the current literature is largely western-focused or 
narrowly tailored to a few specific nations. My research will contribute to the literature by 
focusing on several nations in Latin America, and confirming which conclusions from the 
current body of literature are applicable in my five countries of focus, and why or why not.  
At the heart of this research question is the idea that women represent women. To 
understand the extent to which this is true, we first turn to the literature on the link between 
descriptive and substantive representation. In her book on political representation, Hanna Pitkin 
was one of the first scholars to delineate the two types of representation (Franceschet and 
Piscopo 2008, Celis and Childs 2008). Pitkin distinguishes between legislators who share similar 
characteristics as their constituents, and therefore describe them, versus legislators who 
substantively act for their constituents by promoting their interests and concerns (Pitkin 1967). 
Pitkin contends that it is more important what representatives “act for” than who they “stand 
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for,” and thus, the composition of legislative bodies is not as important as the policies legislators 
pursue.  
But many scholars, as well as proponents of the feminist movement, believe the two 
conceptions of representation are interconnected (Celis and Childs 2008). Simply put, women 
not only “stand for” other women, but they are also more likely to “act for” women’s interests. 
Although women have varied identities and interests and are certainly not a homogenous group, 
an individual woman can at least share one piece of their identity puzzle with the group of 
women she represents. Franceschet and Piscopo state it best in their 2008 article: “The link 
between descriptive and substantive representation does not require a one-to-one correlation 
between being like and speaking for. Shared interests simply broaden the agenda (Franceschet 
and Piscopo 2008). 
The theory of “politics of presence,” first put forth by Phillips, contends that a link 
between descriptive and substantive representation exists, and suggests that female legislators are 
the best at representing the interests of female constituents (Wangnerud 2009, Phillips 1995). 
Phillips’ argument rests on the idea that, broadly, women and men have different life 
experiences. For example, women share the experiences of bearing children, dealing with sexual 
violence and sexual harassment, and facing gender discrimination. However, Phillips recognizes 
that the overlap of shared female experience is not complete, nor is it a guarantee of a unified 
policy platform, stating, “The shared experience of women as women can only ever figure as 
a promise of shared concerns, and there is no obvious way of establishing strict accountability to 
women as a group.” However, it is worth exploring the extent to which the shared experiences of 
women translate to policy actions.  
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Following Phillips’ theoretical framework suggesting female legislators are the most 
effective to substantively represent women, many scholars have examined how female legislators 
vote on certain issues that directly affect women, such as reproductive rights and women’s 
workplace issues. Swers examined how the gender of U.S. representatives affects their votes on 
issues that directly affect women. Swers found that female representatives are more likely to 
cross party lines and vote together when a bill directly affects women (Swers 1998). She also 
found that the relationship between gender and voting on women’s issues was strongest for votes 
dealing with abortion or women’s health. In her 2013 book, she asserted that female 
representatives are stronger proponents of social welfare programs and women’s workplace 
rights. Swers controlled for other common influences on congressional voting, including party, 
personal characteristics, and ideology. Much of the relationship could be attributed to Republican 
women crossing party lines to vote more liberally in regards to women’s issues. But Swers found 
that on issues less directly related to women, such as education, the influence of gender was 
overcome by other factors such as party or ideology (Swers 1998).  
Research from Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) also shows that female leaders are more 
likely to implement policies that are directly relevant to their own gender. Their study showed 
that women serving on village councils in India were able to tailor the types of public goods 
provided by the local government in order to specifically benefit women.  
However, even if women tend to vote together on women’s issues, simply electing 
women to legislatures may not be enough to affect change, especially when women are still the 
minority gender in the legislature. These female legislators must additionally be effective at 
implementing their policy preferences. Jeydel and Taylor (2003) studied the effectiveness of 
women as legislators in the U.S. House of Representatives. They measured legislator 
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effectiveness, broadly defined as the ability to turn policy preferences into law, by looking at 
data on bill and amendment sponsorship and the ultimate allocation of federal domestic funding. 
The authors found that gender did not have a significant influence on legislator effectiveness. 
Instead, they argue that legislator effectiveness is influenced by seniority, committee 
memberships, and other preferences. Although these previous studies provide us with some 
insight into the effectiveness of female legislators and their willingness to cross party lines when 
it comes to women’s issues, many of them are focused on the United States or other developed 
nations.  
When discussing the effectiveness of female legislators on promoting women’s issues, 
we must also look at critical mass theory, which has its problems but nevertheless plays an 
important role in gender politics. Critical mass theory as it relates to gender politics holds that a 
certain percentage of women are required in a political body in order to affect change. Although 
the idea of a specific turning point to go from a small minority to a large minority (usually 30 
percent) is commonly touted as conventional wisdom among feminist movements and female 
politicians, many scholars have reservations (Childs and Krook 2006, Dahlerup 2006, 
Franceschet and Piscopo 2008). Dahlerup calls critical mass a “story” used by female politicians 
to explain why they have not made more of a difference, or by feminist movements to justify the 
election of enough women to constitute a critical mass (Dahelrup 2006). In her 1998 article about 
women in Scandinavian politics, Dahlerup explains why the concept of a critical mass should be 
replaced with the concept of a critical act: “…The crucial point is whether women in politics 
develop some common ideas they want to fight for.” Examples of critical acts would include 
implementing legislative quotas for women or female politicians consciously recruiting other 
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women, both of which change the position of women in politics and would lead to change down 
the line (Dahlerup 1998).  
Other scholars have also found evidence contradicting the 30 percent benchmark for a 
critical mass of women in a legislature. Bratton studied skewed state legislatures in the United 
States in which women make up less than 15 percent of the legislative body. She found that 
“token” women were not marginalized, but rather more likely to develop legislative agendas that 
were different form their male counterparts (Bratton 2005). Moreover, Bratton states, “Women 
are generally as successful as men in passing the legislation that they sponsor, and that in very 
homogeneous settings, they are sometimes more successful than men (2005).” On the contrary, 
Grey found that for female legislators in New Zealand, “increased female presence in both the 
legislature and in government executives also correlates with a rise in overt hostility toward 
feminist agendas (Grey 2006).”  
It is clear that there is no universal formula for the percentage of women in a legislature 
that will be able to enact legislation beneficial to women as a group (Childs and Krook 2006). 
Depending on circumstances, women may be more effective legislators as their minority group 
grows or they may be less effective at enacting legislation beneficial to women as a result of 
backlash from their male legislators, or because greater numbers allow women to pursue their 
own individual policy agendas (Childs and Krook 2009). However, as previously stated, much of 
the current research is focused on the United States and or other developed, Western countries.  
The literature has not greatly explored how these opposing findings play out in Latin America. 
As the percentage of women increases in Latin American legislatures, is it possible that “critical 
acts” such as recruiting more women, or passing gender quota laws, become easier for female 
legislators to tackle? Or as women become a larger minority in the legislature, will their policy 
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agendas begin to diverge from women’s issues or be met with greater hostility from their male 
counterparts?  
Latin America presents it’s own unique challenges for women. The social construct of 
machismo persists, by which male dominance and superiority are legitimized by a patriarchal 
social system (Mayo and Resnick 1996, Segrest et. al. 2003). Meanwhile women are also 
influenced by the marianismo ideal, or the stereotypical female counterpoint to machismo, based 
on the ideals of the Virgin Mary — fragility, submissiveness and holiness (Stevens 1973, Segrest 
et. al. 2003). Latin American women are often socialized into accepting the dictates of male 
superiority, and trained to be housewives and mothers (Mayo and Resnick 1996). Thus, 
machismo culture presents an additional barrier in encouraging women to pursue work outside of 
the home, such as running for legislative office. Although the unique challenges in Latin 
America make it an interesting place to delve into questions regarding substantive representation, 
the current body of research is not well developed. Much of the current research on female 
legislators is only tangentially related to the question of female legislators’ impact on women’s 
issues, or is only focused on one nation. 
For example, Htun (2014) studied the political effects of Afrodescendant women’s 
inclusion in six Latin American legislatures, finding that black, female legislators acted in the 
interest of their broader demographic groups to advance the rights of women, Afrodescendants, 
and other marginalized groups. 
Caldwell (2010) studied substantive representation in both Costa Rica and New Zealand, 
countries with similar percentages of female legislators. She found that with a critical minority of 
at least 30 percent women in the Costa Rican legislature led to an increase in bills pertaining to 
women. Furthermore, she found that the effect was more dramatic in New Zealand, where 
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female legislators were elected without the aid of a gender quota, than in Costa Rica, where a 
high percentage of female legislators was mandated by quota (Caldwell 2010). Similarly, 
research on substantive representation in Argentina, the first nation to implement a legislative 
gender quota, shows that although female Argentine legislators were proposing numerous bills 
related to women’s issues, many did not pass or died in committee (Htun 2013, Franceschet, S., 
& Piscopo 2008). Many of the female legislators interviewed by the authors believed they were 
negatively stereotyped as “quota women,” which undermined their ability to accumulate power 
and influence (Franceschet, S., & Piscopo 2008). Legislators who feel they are stereotyped as 
“quota women” may be more cautious about engaging with and promoting women’s issues. 
Schwindt-Bayer (2010) focused her study of women’s substantive representation on three 
nations — Argentina, Colombia and Costa Rica — and found that the presence of female 
legislators did bring women’s issues to the legislative agenda through their presence on 
committees related to women’s interests. However, she called the representation of women in 
Latin America a “double edged sword.” Female legislator’s prioritization of women’s rights and 
social issues was part of the reason for their continued marginalization in the legislature 
(Franceschet 2012, Schwindt-Bayer 2010).  
My research will focus on Argentina, Costa Rica, The Dominican Republic, Chile, and 
Uruguay. For the nations that have already been studied widely, such as Argentina and Costa 
Rica, I hope to explore whether the trends previous scholars have found hold up over time, and 
determine if some of the results regarding substantive representation are more widely applicable 
to the region as a whole.  For the nations that have yet to be studied in depth, my research will 
fill in some of the gaps pertaining to South America in the literature on substantive 
representation.  
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Chapter Two: Theory 
Theory and Hypotheses 
The following section will explain my main assertion, as well as related two secondary 
assertions. Firstly, I explain how increased female participation in a legislature can cause an 
increase in the number of bills proposed related to women’s issues, and subsequently an increase 
in the number of bills passed related to women’s issues. Secondly, I will address how increased 
female participation in a legislature can impact lawmaking in other branches of government. The 
theory will explain how changes in the demographics of the legislature can influence executive 
decisions and administrative leadership, thus extending the power of the female representatives 
beyond the legislature. Finally, I will investigate how the percentage of women in a legislature 
affects the importance and reach of laws. I will construct a framework for what constitutes a 
substantive law versus a less impactful, symbolic law. The theory will then explain why laws 
related to women’s issues may become more meaningful as more women are elected to the 
legislature — female representatives have a greater incentive to create meaningful outcomes for 
women rather than symbolically acknowledge women.  
As previously stated, the broad goal of this project is to investigate the question, “Do 
women advance women?” My primary assertion is that yes, female legislators do advance 
women by increasing the number of bills passed related to women’s issues. And as more women 
enter the legislature, more bills related to women’s issues would pass.  
Of course, there are many other factors that could increase the number of bills related to 
women’s issues. From women’s movements and women’s caucuses to left-leaning political 
parties and parties hoping to attract more female voters, there are numerous actors besides 
female legislators that are involved with advancing women’s interests and lobbying for women’s 
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rights. Previous literature has firmly established three causal mechanisms for the passage of 
female-centric legislation: 1) the influence of leftist parties, 2) well-funded and well-supported 
bureaucratic agencies that are led by progressive women, and 3) robust women’s movements 
(which may include the presence of a women’s caucus in the legislature).  
In Stetson and Mazur’s book on comparative state feminism, they found that numerous 
types of governmental structures designed to address women’s issues actually contribute to 
policies that advance women (Stetson and Mazur 1995). These include state offices such as 
national offices for women, government-created women’s societies and women’s lobbies. To add 
a layer to the equation of advancing women, the authors found that strong state feminist offices 
were “all created under the initiatives of Social Democratic governments that placed gender 
equality on their policy agendas, amid relatively strong pressure from moderate feminist groups 
(Stetson and Mazur 1995).” Undoubtedly, there are many mechanisms in addition to female 
legislators that may impact the number of laws related to women’s issues that a legislature 
passes. However, my theory will focus solely on the legislators themselves, and specifically the 
links between descriptive and substantive representation, in an attempt to isolate the impacts, if 
any, of electing female legislators. 
To that end, I hypothesize the following causal chain to explain the assertion that female 
legislators do advance women: first, increased female representation in the national legislature 
will make it easier for women to introduce bills, speak up in the legislature, and gain support for 
women’s issues.  
With more women in government, the “boys club” mentality will be diminished in the 
legislature. There are countless stories of female legislators facing “subtle sexism” — such as 
gendered comments about their appearances, weight, or proper place in the workforce 
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(Karpowitz and Mendelberg 2014). One can imagine that female legislators in Latin America 
may experience even more sexism in the workplace as their political ambitions clash with a 
pervasive culture of machismo. Not only do these comments make the legislature a less friendly 
place for women, but they also impede their ability to work as effectively as possible. Borrowing 
from the field of psychology, Glick and Fiske (2001) assert that women who are seen as usurping 
men’s power experience hostile sexism. Additionally, an alternative brand of sexism that seems 
like a compliment on the surface, what the authors call “benevolent sexism,” is also harmful 
because it diminishes the authority of women by putting them on a pedestal and praising those 
who embrace traditional gender roles (Glick and Fiske 2001). Although it may seem 
insignificant, this pervasive benevolent sexism in male-dominated institutions impacts the ability 
of women to work effectively. Karpowitz and Mendelberg (2014) studied local politics in the 
United States, specifically looking at political institutions that were run by majority rule and 
where women were in the minority. The authors found that in these political institutions, women 
were less likely to speak or take up floor time (Karpowitz and Mendelberg 2014). Likewise, 
female politicians in male-dominated institutions were “less likely to raise issues of distinctive 
importance to women on national surveys, such as the needs of families and children or the 
plight of the poor and needy.” Moreover, women who were outnumbered in a political body 
were more likely to be interrupted by male colleagues. However, as the number of women grew, 
the interruptions by men grew less frequent or changed to interruptions offering support. Overall, 
as the number of women in a political body increased, the amount of time they spoke, the content 
of their speech and the behavior of their male colleagues was altered (Karpowitz 2014). I posit 
that these positive changes for female politicians will hold true in Latin American legislatures as 
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the number of women increases. As a result, it will become easier for female legislators to speak 
up and garner support for issues they care about.         
In turn, this will lead to more legislation proposed to enable gender equality. I expect that 
when more women are in legislative positions, there will be more bills proposed regarding 
women-centric issues such as eliminating barriers to education for women, funding women’s 
education, promoting workplace equality, and instituting paid parental leave. This assertion is 
based on the current body of research, which shows that female leaders are more likely to 
implement policies that are directly relevant to their own gender (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 
2004). Moreover, scholars studying substantive representation have concluded that female 
legislators are the best at representing the interests of female constituents (Wangnerud 2009, 
Phillips 1995). Simply put, women not only “stand for” other women, but they are also more 
likely to “act for” women’s interests. 
Furthermore, increased female representation will likely allow women to be more 
persuasive and influential in the legislative process. Prior literature suggests women are effective 
legislators. Especially important to this research is the finding that women tend to cross party 
lines to vote with other female legislators on women-centric issues (Swers 1998). My theory 
does not take into account party discipline. Rather, it assumes that women have freedom to vote 
across party lines. However, party politics still play a key role in how persuasive women in the 
legislature may be. As more women enter the legislature, it is likely that some female legislators 
will move up in the leadership of their party and therefore have increased influence over the 
policy agenda.  
Other scholars go as far as asserting that women outperform men in legislatures (Anzia 
and Berry 2011). Because female legislators face sex discrimination in the voting process, only 
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the most talented, qualified, and hardworking women are actually elected to office (Anzia and 
Berry 2011). Additionally, evidence suggests that women are prone to low political ambition 
when compared to men of equal merit. Fox and Lawless find that the gender differences stem 
from two factors: “First, women are far less likely than men to be encouraged to run for office; 
second, women are significantly less likely than men to view themselves as qualified to run 
(2004).” Therefore, the women who do run for office will likely be more qualified than the 
average male candidate. In other words, many potential female candidates are filtered out in the 
electoral process due to sex-based selection bias, and thus “the women we observe in office will, 
on average, outperform the men (Anzia and Berry 2011).” Perhaps these explanations for why 
women outperform men may diminish as more women enter the political arena. However, for the 
purposes of this project, most of the case study countries do not come close to achieving gender 
parity in the electoral process. As a result, the sex-based selection bias that would allow us to 
reasonably conclude that female legislators are more successful than their male counterparts 
remains intact in most Latin American nations. 
Considering this evidence of the effectiveness of female legislators, it follows that if 
more women are elected to national legislatures, then not only would more legislation to enable 
gender equality be proposed, but more of this legislation would also be passed and implemented.  
Hypothesis 1: If female representation in a legislature increases, then the number of 
legislative bills passed related to women’s issues will increase.  
My null hypothesis for H1 is that increased representation of women in national 
legislatures of will have no effect on the number of legislative bills passed related to women’s 
issues. 
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 However, it is important to recognize that a nation’s policy surrounding women and 
women’s issues is not created in a legislative vacuum. In addition to legislative laws regarding 
women’s issues, there are also policies being implemented through executive order, 
administrative bodies and the court system. My secondary assertion is that as female 
representation in the legislature increases, not only will it impact the number of laws related to 
women’s issues that are passed within the legislature, but it will also impact policy decisions 
made in other branches of government. For the purposes of this project, I focused on potential 
increases in executive orders related to women’s issues. 
 Most study on legislative-executive relations holds that these two branches of 
government are expected to work together cordially (Oni 2014). In general, it is considered 
desirable when there is cooperation and understanding between the chief executive and national 
assembly, and when legislators perceive that the balance of power is acceptable (Oni 2014, 
Bernick and Wiggins 1981). Although each nation’s legislative-executive power dynamic is 
obviously different, the concept that it is desirable when there is cooperation and understanding 
between the chief executive and national assembly has been applied internationally (Oni 2014). I 
posit that this concept will hold true in Latin America. As previously asserted, if more women 
enter the legislature, they are likely to advance women’s interests. It follows that the executive 
branch would have to follow suit to remain cordial with the legislative branch. A cooperative 
legislative-executive relationship would break down if the legislative became less male-
dominated and more likely to discuss women’s issues but the executive branch remained a 
“boys’ club.”  
The underlying link between the legislative branch and the executive branch is the 
mechanism of party politics. All of the case study countries are presidential systems with multi-
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party legislatures elected by proportional representation (Political Database of the Americas). 
The combination of a presidential system and multi-party legislature means that the president is 
elected independent of the congress, and may not benefit from support of the majority party in 
the legislature. In some multi-party systems, there may not be a majority party at all. As a result, 
presidents must find other ways to build coalitions in order to pass their policy agenda. In their 
research comparing the multiparty presidential system in Indonesia to similar systems in Latin 
America, Melo and Pereira state:  
“The fragmented party systems typical in Latin America make exchange mechanisms 
crucial. If democracy is to work-indeed, if it is to last-the government in general and the 
president in particular must build and keep winning coalitions. In order to do so, the 
president needs to be strong and attractive to different coalition partners (2012).” 
The authors contend that multi-party presidential systems are possible in part through the 
availability of trade-worthy goods that can be used to form coalitions, such as cabinet 
appointments, pork-barrel spending, executive orders to advance a certain group’s policy agenda, 
and policy concessions (Melo and Pereira 2012).  
As previously stated, my theory does not take into account party discipline, and assumes 
that female legislators are free to vote across party lines, especially on legislation regarding 
women’s issues. Considering this, as well as Melo and Pereira’s theory, I argue that Latin 
American presidents may attempt to advance women’s interests through “trade-worthy” 
mechanisms as an attempt to attract female legislators as coalition partners in the legislature. 
(This could not only impact the number of executive orders or policy concessions related to 
women’s issues, but also impact administrative laws. It is easy to foresee a scenario in which a 
president appoints cabinet officials who are interested in advancing women’s issues in order to 
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appeal to female legislators. However, the scope of this project was too narrow to include 
administrative laws from all ministries of each of the five countries of focus.)   
Thus, I hypothesize that as the number of women in the legislature increases, their 
influence on the executive branch will also increase. Therefore, the number of executive orders 
related to women’s issues will also increase, for two reasons: 1) The executive hopes to maintain 
an amicable relationship with the legislature, and must appeal to a growing number of women in 
order to do so, and 2) the executive has an incentive to appease female legislators with trade-
worthy goods in order to form coalitions and overcome the limitations of a multi-party 
presidential system.     
Hypothesis 2: If female representation in a legislature increases, then the number of 
executive orders related to women’s issues will increase. 
My null hypothesis for H2 is that increased representation of women in national 
legislatures will have no effect on the number of executive orders related to women’s issues. 
 
Finally, when discussing the advancement of women through policymaking, it is 
important to not only focus on the number of policy changes being implemented, but also the 
degree of importance of each policy change. For example, it is clear that a comprehensive reform 
of maternity leave and early childcare policy would be more important to the overall female 
agenda than a declaration for a “National Day of Women.” Considering the previous discussion 
of links between descriptive and substantive representation, I contend that women not only 
“stand for” other women, but they are also more likely to “act for” women’s interests (Celis and 
Childs 2008, Franceschet and Piscopo 2008). In acting for women’s interests, I expect that 
female legislators will be more interested in pursuing policies that create actual changes in the 
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material position of women in society, or actual changes to rights rather than policies that merely 
look good on paper. I hypothesize that as more women enter the legislature, the bills and laws 
passed related to women’s issues will be more meaningful and central to the women’s agenda. 
Similar to my primary hypothesis, this too depends on the effectiveness of female 
legislators as well as party politics. As more women enter the legislature, it becomes easier for 
women to introduce bills that are of greater importance, gain support for policies that would 
substantially move the needle for women, and move beyond marginal policy change. These gains 
will also become easier as women move up in the leadership of their own parties.  
Hypothesis 3: As female representation in legislatures increases, bills and laws passed related 
to women’s issues will be more meaningful rather than marginal. 
 My null hypothesis for H3 is that increased representation of women in national 
legislatures will have no effect on the degree of meaning of the laws passed related to women’s 
issues. 
 
Chapter Three: Methodology 
Defining Women’s Issues 
In order to study the relationship between women in legislatures and the advancement of 
women’s issues, I first defined a list of “women’s issues.” In creating my definition, I focused on 
issues that directly effect women rather than on issues that women have professed to care about. 
Since my research is aimed at answering the question, “Do women advance women?” a more 
narrow definition of women’s issues, focused only on policies that directly effect women, is 
necessary. This more narrow definition includes issues and policies that were designed with 
gender in mind, for example, maternity leave policies, divorce policies and equal pay policies. In 
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coding legislation, I included most laws that specifically mentioned gender, sex or women, or 
laws that applied specifically to women. My definition also includes issues that primarily affect 
women, such as rape and domestic violence. This approach differs from the methodology of 
some other scholars, who have looked at active women’s organizations within case study 
countries to determine which issues are of importance to women (Swers 2002, Caldwell 2010). 
For example, Caldwell found that women’s groups in Guatemala organized around rights of the 
indigenous (Caldwell 2010). Yet, as this is not a policy area that is related specifically to women, 
it is not included in my definition of women’s issues. In creating my definition of women’s 
issues I also tried to be cautious of highly politicized issues surrounding women, and 
confounding women’s issues with partisan issues. For example, abortion rights are often 
included in discussions of women’s issues, but they are often supported only by leftist parties, 
and, in fact, many women oppose abortion rights. Below is the list of words related to women’s 
issues, translated into Spanish, which I used as search terms in each case study country’s legal 
code database. 
1. women/woman mujer(es) 
2. gender género 
3. sex sexo 
4. female  femenino 
5. feminism feminismo 
6. mother madre 
7. maternity:  maternidad 
8. sexual harassment acoso sexual 
9. sexual assault asalto sexual 
10. equal pay igualdad de salarios 
11. equal pay pago igual 
12. rape violación 
13. reproductive reproductivo 
14. sexism sexismo 
15. male gender role machismo 
16. female gender role marianismo 
17. domestic violence violencia domestica 
18. violence against women violencia contra las 
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mujeres 
19. divorce divorcio 
20. childcare cuidado de niños 
21. harassment hostigamiento 
 
In coding the legislation, I also denoted how meaningful the legislation was to the 
advancement of women’s issues. I define “meaningful” legislation as legislation that is 
considered a major achievement for women’s interests. More concretely, this is legislation that 
creates actual changes in the material position of women in society, or actual changes to rights. 
Meaningful legislation moves the needle for women’s rights in important areas. By contrast, 
marginal legislation indicates achievements that are only minimal, or are merely symbolic. For 
example, declaring a “National Day for Women” sounds nice on paper, but it has marginal 
importance in the grand scheme of women’s advancement and has minimal impact on policy 
solutions for women. Other examples of legislation or executive orders that I denoted as 
marginal include 1) laws that create a committee or new position related to women’s interests, 2) 
laws that create an honorary order or day of recognition related to women’s interests, 3) laws that 
include a generic anti-discrimination clause that is not exclusively related to gender 
discrimination, but rather includes a blanket statement about equal application of law regardless 
of race, ethnicity, gender, age, etc. (for example, all Wage Council laws in Uruguay, which are 
largely unrelated to women’s issues specifically, are required to have a generic equality clause), 
4) laws that outline future objectives related to women’s issues. While these symbolic gains are 
important, and often times lead to more impactful changes down the road, they are marginal in 
comparison to legislation and executive orders that create changes in women’s rights and the 
position of women in society.  
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I created a bivariate measure for how “meaningful” each law is, and assigned each law a 
number: “1” for marginal and, and “2” for meaningful. Although this variable is somewhat 
subjective, I felt that it was important to attempt to distinguish between legislation that is central 
to the female agenda and legislation that is on the periphery.          
 
Research Design 
To study the relationship between women in legislatures and the advancement of 
women’s issues, I used a country level, case study approach, as well as quantitative comparisons 
between the countries. Case study research allowed me to delve into specific legislation and 
country-level policies regarding gender equality and discuss potential causal mechanisms 
specific to each country. For my quantitative analysis, my unit of analysis was the country-year 
— this allowed me to not only make comparisons between the five case study countries, but also 
between different years within the same country.   
To operationalize the independent variable of women in lower houses, I relied on Inter-
Parliamentary Union data on the percentage of females who occupied seats in the lower houses 
of legislatures in Latin America between 2000 and 2010. Keeping the time period consistent 
throughout cases helps control for supranational trends in women’s rights, politics, and other 
international factors. I excluded upper houses of legislatures from the research because 1) the 
data available on upper houses are much more inconsistent and incomplete, 2) upper houses are 
often ceremonial, and 3) some nations have unicameral legislatures without an upper house at all. 
Additionally, upper houses tend to be smaller, meaning that adding just a few more female 
representatives could greatly change the gender percentages. Although some nations have upper 
houses that are vital to legislative proceedings, it is more valid in a cross-national analysis to 
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compare the larger lower houses. I used the eleven-year period to allow me to see change over 
time as the percentage of women in each national legislature increased. Between 2000 and 2010, 
several Latin American nations began to implement gender quotas for elections or gender quotas 
in the legislature. Even most nations without quota laws saw an increase in female 
representatives during this time period. 
To operationalize the dependent variable, or the number of laws passed related to 
women’s issues, I coded legislation from each of the five case study countries by using their 
national online legal code databases. I searched for the key terms listed above to find laws that fit 
within my definition of women’s issues. I then coded the laws that fit within the framework, 
taking note of the year, branch of government where the law originated, keywords, and whether 
the law was “meaningful” or “marginal”. Because some legislatures are more productive than 
others, I looked at the number of women-centric laws as a percentage of all laws passed, rather 
than looking at absolute numbers of laws.   
 
Limitations of Data 
The quantitative analysis portion of this project relied entirely on governmental databases 
of legislation, which had its limitations. The quantitative portion of this project relied on the 
assumption that the governmental databases were a complete record of all legislative and 
executive laws passed. However, I was unable to find a searchable database for executive orders 
in the Dominican Republic, so the nation is left out of analysis of executive orders. Nor was I 
able to find an accurate count for the total number of executive orders passed during this time 
period in Uruguay, and therefore could not calculate the percentage of all executive orders that 
the executive orders related to women’s interest represented.  
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Moreover, since each country organized their data in different ways and had different 
search capabilities, the comparison between each nation’s data is complicated. For example, 
Argentina’s legislative database had a very sensitive search filter, which would search the 
complete text of each law for the keyword, related keywords and different forms of that word. 
Meanwhile, Costa Rica’s database had a more limited search function, which in some cases was 
unable to search the entire text of a law, and the Dominican Republic’s database required 
keywords to be longer than five letters. Subsequently, results could be skewed to make it appear 
that a country has passed more laws related to women’s issues, when in reality the country 
simply has a better legal database.  
 To combat some of these issues, I used keywords that overlapped. Often times, laws 
which included the word “gender” would also include the word “sex,” or laws related to 
“maternity” would also include the word “mother.” As a result, many of these searches yielded 
overlapping results, which ensured that fewer laws were able to fall through the cracks of the 
search process. Additionally, to circumvent minimum letter requirements, I searched for the 
keywords themselves, the plural forms of the keywords, and keywords including an article (for 
example, “la madre” instead of “madre”). To further improve the cross-country comparison, I 
used multiple translations of the same word to account for different dialects of Spanish that are 
used in different countries.  
 
Case Study Selection 
 For my case studies, I chose to focus specifically on the region of Latin America. Not 
only did I focus on this region because it is of particular interest to me, but also for the sake of 
easier comparison. To ensure the validity of my case study selection, I wanted to avoid choosing 
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five random nations from across the globe, which may have very different factors impacting the 
lives of women. Argentina, Costa Rica, The Dominican Republic, Chile, and Uruguay share 
similar histories regarding the treatment of women. All five case study countries have 
presidential, multi-party systems of government with similar timelines for the advancement of 
women and cultural concepts of machismo and marianismo. By limiting the case studies to Latin 
America, I hope to have more comparable cases. Each of the countries chosen is considered a 
strong democracy by the Polity IV scale of democracy and has legislative data that is considered 
transparent and accurately reported (Polity IV). However, the nations are varied enough in their 
policies, histories, and current state of women in the legislature to allow me to draw conclusions 
from their differences. For comparison, I chose two nations that have historically had higher 
percentages of women in the legislature — Argentina and Costa Rica. During the 2000 to 2010 
time period, Argentina began with 28 percent female legislators — well above the regional 
average of 15.3 percent — and grew to 38.5 percent female. Perhaps more drastically, Costa 
Rica’s percentage of women grew from 19.3 to 38.6. I also chose a nation that was in the middle-
of-the-pack, The Dominican Republic, in which female representation in the lower house grew 
from 16.1 to 19.7 during this eleven-year period. Finally, I chose two nations with low levels of 
female representation compared to the rest of South America in this time period — Chile (from 
10.8 percent to 14.2 percent) and Uruguay (from 12.1 percent to 15.2 percent). These changes in 
representation are outlined in the table below, which also includes regional averages for the 
Americas, world averages, and the United States’ percentage of female representatives during 
this time period for the sake of comparison.  
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Growth in Percentage of Female Legislators in Lower House, 2000-2010 
 
Country 
Percentage of 
women in lower 
house — 2000 
Percentage of 
women in lower 
house — 2010 
 
Argentina 28 38.5 
Chile 10.8 14.2 
Costa Rica 19.3 38.6 
The Dominican Republic 16.1 19.7 
Uruguay 12.1 15.2 
Regional Average — The Americas 15.3 22.2 
World Average 13.4 19.1 
The United States (for reader comparison) 13.3 16.8 
 
The nations differ in other ways related to women in government as well: Argentina and 
The Dominican Republic implemented legislative gender quota laws in the early nineties, while 
Costa Rica and Uruguay did not implement quotas until much more recently, meaning the effects 
of those laws do not fall within the time period for this project. Chile still does not have 
legislative gender quota laws (The Quota Project 2015). Finally, political parties in power varied 
throughout this eleven-year period for each of the case study nations, which allowed me to 
analyze the impact of the ruling party on legislation related to women’s issues.   
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Chapter Four: Quantitative Analysis and Findings 
Introduction 
Regressions comparing the percentages of female legislators to various indicators 
associated with the amount of legislation advancing women’s issues yielded no statistically 
significant correlations. The results of these regression analyses point to the conclusion that 
mechanisms besides the raw numbers of female legislators, most likely the three other factors 
most often cited in previous literature (the left party mechanism, women’s agencies and women’s 
movements) have a stronger influence on legislative outcomes.1 Further consideration of the 
party mechanism in the five countries of study will be explored through case studies in the next 
chapter. Meanwhile, a regression comparing the percentage of women with the percentage of 
meaningful laws did yield statistically significant results, but in the opposite direction of what I 
hypothesized. Results show that greater representation of women in a legislature is associated 
with a higher percentage of gender-related laws being “marginal.”  
 
Quantitative Findings 
Plots comparing the percentage of all laws passed that were related to women’s issues to 
the average percentage of women in the legislature of each country during the eleven-year time 
period show no statistically significant correlation, with a Pearson correlation coefficient of less 
that .2 (see graph 1). Graphing the correlation between the total number of laws related to 
women’s issues to the average percentage of women in the legislature yields a higher correlation, 
but one that is still statistically insignificant (r = .55674).  
                                                
1 As this project only uses five countries for analysis, there are insufficient data points to perform most 
statistical analyses. Therefore, my quantitative analysis relies mainly upon correlation, which is supplemented   
further case study analysis. 
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r = .18659, p= .763812 à  No significant relationship 
 
 
Individual country level analysis of laws and executive orders compared to the 
percentage of women in the legislature each year leads to similarly inconclusive results. 
Although plots comparing the percentage of laws related to women’s issues to the percentage of 
women in the legislature each year for Argentina (graph 2) and Costa Rica (graph 3) appear 
somewhat correlated, the Pearson correlation coefficients (r) show no statistical significance (see 
table 1). Therefore, from a quantitative perspective, I fail to reject the null hypothesis H1, which 
states that increased representation of women in national legislatures will have no effect on the 
number of legislative bills passed related to women’s issues. Likewise, table 3.2 shows that 
executive orders are also not correlated at statistically significant levels, and therefore, I also fail 
to reject null hypothesis H2, which states that increased representation of women in national 
legislatures will have no effect on the number of executive orders related to women’s issues. 
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Table 1: Laws (legislative) 
Country Correlation between % women and 
% laws related to women’s issues 
P value Statistically significant at 
significance level .05 (Y/N) 
Argentina -0.053474792 .877008 N 
Costa Rica 0.332045325 .318537 N 
Chile 0.054457932 .873782 N 
 
Dominican Republic -0.590624532 .056048 N 
Uruguay -0.354752167 .285487 N 
 
Table 2: Executive Orders 
Country Correlation b/w % women and % 
exec. orders related to women’s issues 
P value Statistically significant at 
significance level .05 (Y/N) 
Argentina 0.04020341 .906582 N 
Costa Rica -0.069028632 .840243 N 
Chile 0.172396465 .612437 N 
 
Dominican Republic N/A N/A N/A 
Uruguay N/A N/A N/A 
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r  = -0.053474792à  No significant relationship 
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An analysis of the number of meaningful versus marginal laws and executive orders at 
the country-level yielded unexpected findings. In general, nations with higher average 
percentages of women in the legislature passed more “marginal” laws and executive orders. For 
example, Argentina, the case study nation with the highest average percentage of women in the 
legislature (33.53%) passed 23 marginal laws during the eleven-year period, constituting 43.4% 
of all laws related to women’s issues passed during this time period. Meanwhile, Uruguay, the 
case study nation with the lowest percentage of women in the legislature (12.2%) passed just 3 
marginal laws out of 33 total laws related to women’s issues, or 9.09% marginal. 
A plot of the percentage of laws that were meaningful versus the average percentage of 
women during the eleven-year time period shows a strong negative correlation (see graph 4). The 
relationship has a Pearson correlation coefficient of -.9 and a p-value of .037, making it 
statistically significant at the .05 level. Therefore, I reject the null hypothesis H3, which states 
that increased representation of women in national legislatures will have no effect on the degree 
of meaning of the laws passed related to women’s issues. There is, indeed, an effect on the 
degree of meaning of the laws passed — however, the relationship is the opposite of what I 
hypothesized. As the average percentage of women increases, so does the percentage of laws 
related to women’s issues that are considered “marginal.” 
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r = -.9, p = .037386 à  Statistically significant negative relationship 
 
This finding has several possible causal mechanisms. Celis and Childs (2008) explain 
that representatives who foster substantive representation for women engage in a variety of acts 
that have different roles. While some of these acts, such as voicing women’s concerns and voting 
in a manner that substantively represents women’s interests could lead to “meaningful” laws 
being passed, other activities, such as prioritizing and constructing women’s interests could lead 
to laws that are considered “marginal,” such as outlining objectives related to women’s 
advancement or creating a committee with an organization to focus on the role of women (Celis 
and Childs 2008). Another explanation is that symbolic victories for women are politically 
beneficial, and do not incite opposition or require much effort by legislators. Finally, the lack of 
meaningful legislation could be attributed to backlash from male legislators. This was one theory 
offered by Childs and Crook to explain how female legislators could be ineffective even as their 
numbers grow (Childs and Crook 2009). As more women enter the legislature, they likely 
propose more bills related to women’s issues, including meaningful bills. However, male 
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legislators fight these women-centric bills or attempt to diminish their impact. Thus, few 
meaningful proposals are passed, and the bills that do get passed are water down and therefore 
less meaningful. Although a similar trend appears to hold true for the number of marginal versus 
meaningful executive orders, I was unable to conclude a statistically significant correlation 
without data on executive orders for the Dominican Republic, or knowledge of the total number 
of executive orders passed during this time period in Uruguay.  
 
Chapter Five: Case Study Analysis 
In the following sections I will place female representation in the context of each 
country’s history, political climate, and timeline of women’s advancement. I will also discuss 
how party politics, women’s movements, gender quota laws, and historic trends of gender 
equality or inequality may have affected present-day female representation. Additionally, I will 
analyze how these same mechanisms may subsequently impact the number and importance of 
laws passed related to women’s issues. 
The largest takeaway from individual case study analysis of the effects of female 
representation is that no cross-country generalization is possible — the number of laws and 
executive orders related to women’s issues and their importance depends very much on the 
context of each country during the given year. Moreover, the three other factors that are 
generally considered to have a significant impact on female-centric legislation — namely leftist 
parties, government agencies in charge of women’s affairs, and women’s movements — were 
more influential than substantive representation of women.  
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1) The Case of Female Representation in Argentina 
 
Country Background and History: 
 
The first case I will focus on is Argentina, which has the highest level of legislative 
female representation in Latin America, and was one of the first nations in the world to adopt 
gender quotas. Following a series of military dictatorships and “The Dirty War,” which ended in 
1983, Argentina has consistently held democratic elections and is considered a stable democracy. 
Argentina is a presidential republic with a multi-party system. The president of Argentina is 
elected for a 4-year term. During the time period studied for this paper, 2000 to 2010, Christina 
Fernández de Kirchner became the first female president to be elected in Argentina. However, 
Isabel Martínez de Perón was technically the first female president of Argentina after she 
assumed the presidency in 1974 following Juan Perón’s death. 
 
Women, Politics, and Political Parties:  
The Argentine Congreso Nacional is bicameral, consisting of a 72 seat Senate and a 257 
seat Chamber of Deputies. Senators serve 6-year terms and Deputies serve 4-year terms. Both 
houses are elected by list proportional representation (PR), which has been shown to favor the 
election of women (Castels 1981, Darcy et. al. 1994, Duverger 1955, Matland 1997).  
The major political parties in Argentina underwent enormous changes during the early 
2000s. Since 2001, the Justicialist Party, which is the remaining Peronist party, dominated 
Argentine politics. The party has two opposing factions, the right-wing “federal Peronist” front, 
and the left-wing “Front for Victory.” The left-wing Justicialists boasted multiple presidential 
terms in power during the 2000s under Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner 
(who would later affiliate with the Front for Victory). Their success was facilitated by the 2001 
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collapse of the longstanding Radical Civic Union Party (UCR), a centrist social democratic 
party. It wasn’t until the 2015 elections that parties reorganized into center-left and center-right 
coalitions to put up viable opposition to the Justicialists. There are also many smaller parties that 
frequently win representation in Congress. 
Throughout Argentine history, women have crossed party lines to work together on 
issues of women’s equality. In 1971, representatives from all parties founded the “Group of 
Women Politicians,” which organized to reform women’s rights in the family and pass a divorce 
law (Htun 2009). The issue of equality in the family brought together Peronists, Radicals, jurists 
and even some conservatives (Htun 2009).  
The first women were elected to Argentine Congress during the height of the Peronist 
Women’s Party in 1951. Twenty-four women won seats in the legislature on the Peronist Party 
ticket, placing Argentina first in the world for female representation (Hinojosa 2009). (In fact, 
the Peronists party’s unofficial gender quotas would eventually aid the passage of the world’s 
first national gender quota law (Waylen 2000.))  
 
History of Women’s Advancement and Legislative Victories: 
Following decades of women’s exclusion from political life, the start of the 20th century 
brought modernization and increased opportunities for women, paving the way for female 
activism and women’s organizations (Hammond 2011). At the turn of the 20th century, three 
Argentine parties — the Radical Party, the Socialist party and the anarchist movement — 
allowed female members. However, the first strictly feminist group, the Consejo Nacional de 
Mujeres, did not affiliate with any of these parties, as they garnered legitimacy by affiliating with 
the mainstream conservative party (Hammond 2011). According to Hammond, “Only when 
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women’s organizations dedicated to political reforms began to appear in the first decade of the 
twentieth century does the feminist movement appear as a political, as distinct form 
revolutionary, phenomenon in Argentina (Hammond 2011).”  
Even with the emergence of women’s organizations in the early 1900s, Argentina was 
slow to reform its civil code, which — like most Latin American nations at the time — was 
severely restrictive of women. Although proposals for reform of female employment restrictions 
and married women’s rights were introduced in the legislature as early as 1915, it took a full ten 
years before any legislation passed the scrutiny of the all-male congress (Lavrin 1998). In 1926, 
the “law of women’s civil rights” was approved, granting women all the “rights and civil 
functions” already afforded to men of legal age. These rights included the ability to enter into 
any career, direct control of earnings, custody of children for unwed or divorced mothers, and the 
ability to participate in civil and criminal court cases (Lavrin 1998). In a short amount of time, 
women gained a foothold in the workplace as notaries, stockbrokers and government employees, 
and made “considerable legal gains” through the court system (Lavrin 1998).  
After gaining equal rights in the civil sphere, the notion of suffrage did not seem as far-
fetched to some Argentine women. However, many people — including some feminist groups — 
rejected the idea, believing that Argentina was not ready for such a radical change (Hammond 
2011). The suffrage movement did not gain a strong foothold until the Radical Party took power 
in San Juan and unilaterally changed the provincial constitution to allow women to vote, thereby 
providing a model for the rest of the nation (Hammond 2011). Yet reform was slow — the 
decades following the 1926 civil code reform proved difficult for the Argentine women’s 
movement as a result of two periods of military rule and frequent changes of power. During the 
three periods of military government in the 1940s, Juan Domingo Perón’s rise to power would 
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cause another shift in the women’s movement. Perón and his wife, Evita, began a “new” feminist 
movement, apart from the Radicals and Socialists who did not support his candidacy, to attract 
women to their movement (Hammond 2011).  It was not until September 1947, during the 
administration of Juan Domingo Perón, that the women’s suffrage law finally passed. Many 
Argentines attributed the success of the law to Evita Perón’s direct involvement (Hammond 
2011). The Peronists were quick to discard the earlier feminists from their Peronist Women’s 
Party, and Evita held a tight grip on the direction of the women’s movement, removing those 
who contested Peronist ideals (Hammond 2011).  
Although the women’s movement was obviously not idle during the Dirty War period 
from 1976 to 1983, there is not a great deal of information from this time period, nor were there 
many significant advances for women. Fast-forwarding to the post-Dirty War period, elite 
feminist groups were revitalized with the return to democracy (Htun 2007). Argentina ratified the 
UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 
July 1985 (United Nations). The same year, the administration of Raúl Alfonsín restored 
women’s right to joint custody, which had been repealed by the military dictatorship in 1956 
(Htun 2007). This meant that men no longer had the final say in many familial decisions. Just a 
few years later, Argentina expanded women’s rights in the family sphere even more by 
legalizing divorce (Hinojosa 2009).  
Although female representation was robust in the Argentine legislature during the Peron 
era, most experts place more weight in Argentina’s record of female descriptive representation 
following the Dirty War because the multiple periods of military rule caused numerous setbacks 
for women’s rights and representation. Following the 1983 elections, only 11 representatives in 
the chamber of deputies were women, or 4.3 percent. Female representation continued to remain 
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low until the passage of Argentina’s national gender quota law in 1991 (Hinojosa 2009). The 
pioneering quota law was enacted in 1991, and was the first law of its kind in Latin America. 
The law states, “Party electoral lists are required to have a minimum of 30% women among their 
candidates for all national elections with real chances of being elected (The Quota Project).” The 
law’s effects were seen almost immediately, with lower house female representation jumping to 
12.5 percent in 1993 and 24.9 percent in 1995 (Hinojosa 2009). The passage of the gender quota 
law has been attributed to a cross-party alliance of women, as well as the support of 
nongovernmental organizations, feminist groups, the National Council of Women, and the 
Menem administration (Waylen 2000, Hinojosa 2009). Likely as a result of the national quota 
law, all major parties have elected a female representative in modern history. Argentina also has 
gender quota laws at the regional level and in Buenos Aires City, and the Justicialist Party has 
adopted a voluntary rule stipulating that the representation of women be respected at all levels 
within the party (The Quota Project).  
Even following the successful reform of the civil code, the suffrage movement, and the 
advances made immediately following the return to democracy, Argentine women still had 
hurdles to overcome to achieve true equal rights. According to an index created in 2009 by 
Universidad Cartólica Uruguay professor Dr. Juan Bogliaccini, Argentina still had one unequal 
rights provision remaining as of 2009. (The index tallies seven different unequal rights 
provisions that remain in certain Latin American civil codes, including requiring women to have 
permits from their husband to enter certain professions, requiring permits from fathers or ex-
husbands to marry, requiring married women’s assets to be managed by husbands, and allowing 
legal punishment for adultery.) In Argentina, certain married women’s assets needed to be 
managed by a woman’s husband as of 2009. (Bogliaccini 2009).  
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Selected Legislative Reforms Between 2000 and 2010:  
 The legislation and executive orders passed in Argentina during this time period were 
nearly equal parts meaningful and marginal. Many executive orders merely outlined objectives 
for advancing women’s rights. For example, an order (decreto nacional 1.106/2000) outlined the 
structure of the Ministry of Health and called for the formulation of programs to reduce infant 
and maternal mortality, but did not offer specifics. Another symbolic order (decreto nacional 
329/2010) declared Eva Perón as the “Woman of the Bicentennial” for her advancement of 
women’s rights. Numerous laws were also found to be “marginal” because they included generic 
equality clauses that condemned not only gender discrimination, but also discrimination based on 
race, ethnicity, etc.  
 Yet there was no shortage of meaningful laws related to women that also passed during 
this time period. A 2005 law called the “Law of Integral Protection of the Rights of Girls, 
Children and Adolescents (ley 26.062)” guaranteed access to health services for children and 
pregnant women. It also prevented discrimination against teen mothers in both private and public 
education institutions. In 2008, ley 26.364 declared adherence to the UN protocol to “Prevent, 
Suppress, and Punish Trafficking Persons,” which in turn led to hundreds of Argentine women 
being saved from sex slavery and sexual exploitation. The legislature tackled another problem 
that disproportionately affects women in 2008 with the passage of the “Declaration of National 
Interest in the Prevention and Control of Food Disorders (ley 26.396).”  
 Perhaps the most important piece of legislation for women in this era was a law to 
“eradicate violence against women (ley 26.485),” passed in 2009. The law called for 
“elimination of discrimination between women and men at all levels of life” as well as “the right 
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for women to live a life without violence.” The landmark law recognized that violence against 
women can be physical, physiological, sexual, economic, and patrimonial. Above all, the law 
provided victims of gender-based violence with economic and psychological support systems. 
 
Explaining Legislative changes:  
 A quick look at the percentage of laws and executive order passed each year between 
2000 and 2010 offers no rhyme or reason. There are few plausible explanations for why the 
graph points jump wildly from one year to the next. The Kirchner’s left-leaning Justicialist 
administrations were in power from 2003 until 2015, offering no explanation for changes during 
those years. Moreover, the Peronists held Congress by a majority during all the years studied.  
 Most plausibly, the wild variation is due to a preoccupation with other issues — namely 
the massive economic crisis that hit Argentina in 2001. In the wake of the economic crisis, 
women’s issues (and all other issues for that matter) took a back seat to economic needs. It is 
likely that laws related to women were passed when they reached the legislature, but were not 
prioritized during this time period. 
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Conclusions for Argentina:  
 Even though Argentina has the highest percentage of female legislators in Latin America, 
with near gender parity in the Argentine legislature, factors unrelated to descriptive 
representation, such as the 2001 economic crisis, could diminish the amount of women-centric 
legislation. In the wake of the economic downturn, Argentine legislators of all genders likely 
prioritized economic needs and welfare policies over legislation related to women’s issues. 
When women-centric legislation was able to pass, it could be attributed to the influence of a 
strong women’s caucus and women’s movement. 
 
 
2) The Case of Female Representation in Costa Rica 
 
Country Background: 
The next case I will focus on is Costa Rica, which also has historically high levels of 
female participation in the legislature. Costa Rica is regarded as one of the most stable 
democracies in Latin America, with no long periods of autocratic rule. It is also one of the few 
nations in the world with no formal military. The strong tradition of democracy allowed 
women’s rights to move forward in Costa Rica long before neighboring Central American 
countries even put women’s political and civil rights on the agenda. Costa Rica is a presidential 
republic with a multi-party electoral system. The president of Costa Rica is elected for a 4-year 
term. During the period studied for this paper, all presidents of Costa Rica were male. However, 
Costa Rica elected its first female president, Laura Chinchilla of the National Liberation Party, in 
2010.  
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Women, Politics, and Political Parties: 
The Costa Rican Asamblea Legislativa is unicameral, with 57 seats. Members are elected 
to 4-year terms, with elections taking place in February (CIA World Factbook). Legislators are 
elected through proportional representation. Following the Costa Rican civil war in 1948, a two-
party system developed under the National Liberation Party (PLN), a social democratic party 
(Booth 2007). Several conservative parties developed as opposition to the PLN, which eventually 
merged to become the Christian-Social Unity Party (PUSC). However, in the early 2000s the 
two-party system gave way to a multi-party system as another social democratic group, The 
Citizens’ Action Party (PAC), gained a foothold in the legislature (Booth 2007).      
The left-leaning PLN established itself as the party most favorable to women shortly after 
women gained the right to vote in 1949. In the first election following the civil war and new 
constitution, all three of the female legislators elected were backed by the PLN (Saint-Germain 
1993). The Costa Rican National Center for the Rights of Women and Families was created 
under a PLN administration in 1975 to work toward improving the lives of women and to 
encourage women to organize (Saint-Germain 1993). And in 1978, the PLN created the first 
intra-party women’s caucus called the Movimiento Femenino. Not only did the caucus push for 
women to rise in the ranks of the party (for example, nine women were appointed to the PLN 
national Directorate in the 1980s), but it also may have helped increase the overall number of 
women in the Costa Rican legislature by encouraging the party to back more female candidates 
(Saint-Germain 1993). By 1986, seven women had been elected to the legislature (12.3%) — all 
backed by the PLN (Saint-Germain 1993). In modern times, the PLN is still viewed as a party 
that is favorable to women. Laura Chinchilla, the first female president of Costa Rica elected in 
2010, was a PLN candidate.   
 45 
 Women’s groups in Costa Rica have also traditionally been organized around left-leaning 
principles. The first modern women’s group, Unión de Mujeres Carmen Lyra, was founded in 
1948 and backed by a small left-wing party (the Partido Vanguardia Popular, or PVP). When 
the PVP collapsed shortly thereafter, the women’s group reorganized into a broader women’s 
movement called the Asociación de Mujeres Costarricense, which also leaned left-of-center 
(Saint-Germain 1993). However, there is really no one unified women’s movement in the nation. 
In fact, by the end of the 80s, there were more than 150 separate women’s groups (Saint-
Germain 1993). In practice, this translates to the women’s movement having limited power due 
to dispersion or organization and lack of communication between different groups (Cabrera 
1997).  
 
History of Women’s Advancement and Legislative Victories: 
In 1916, Costa Rican feminist Angela Acuña pioneered a movement to amend the civil 
code to allow women to work in more professions. Just a few years later, in October 1923, 
Acuña founded the Costa Rican Feminist League, which would lay the groundwork for a broader 
women’s suffrage movement (Fajardo 1997). Yet it would take three decades of struggle for 
women to gain equal political rights. Like many Latin American women’s movements, the Costa 
Rican women’s suffrage movement struggled to find grassroots support, and faced obstacles 
stemming form the nation’s class struggles and  “highly Patriarchal Catholic heritage (Sharratt 
1997).” Suffragettes were repeatedly likened to children or the insane — two other groups barred 
from voting in Costa Rica — or directly told that women’s roles were limited to reproduction 
and homemaking (Fajardo 1997). On May 15, 1943, large public protests in favor of women’s 
suffrage seemed to be tipping the scales on the issue. However, a bill presented to Congress just 
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five days later was rejected on the grounds that the left-leaning party was using women’s 
suffrage for political gain during an election year (Fajardo 1997). It would take five more years 
and another round of protests before women gained the right to vote in the new 1949 
Constitution (Fajardo 1997). 
The Family Code of Costa Rica, passed in 1973, stood out early on for being one of the 
first codes in the world to grant parental authority jointly to both parents and to allow for divorce 
(OECD). However, men are still designated as “bearing the principle expense of the family,” or 
being the head of the household (OECD). Additionally, women often face economic 
discrimination in the wake of divorce and have no legal protections against losses caused by 
destruction of property or the selling of assets by the male partner (OECD).  
In the 1980s, women in Costa Rica began pushing for legal equality in response to low 
female participation in government and the labor market, income inequality and sexual violence 
(Montero 1997). Inspired by the UN Convention on the Discrimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, a “Bill for Women’s True Equality” was introduced to the 
legislature in 1988 (Montero 1997). Immediately, the passage of the bill was doubtful —but 
rather than be killed entirely, it went through a two-year period of debate and revisions. In the 
revision process several key provisions were removed, including an electoral quota system, 
mandatory financing of child-care centers to aid working mothers, and protections for women 
engaged in legal action regarding sexual abuse cases (Montero 1997). When passage seemed 
unlikely, President Óscar Arias (a member of the left-leaning PLN) created the Office of the 
Defender of Women’s Rights within the Ministry of Justice, an important reform in its own right. 
Through the President’s “Immediate Action Plan,” some demands of the women’s movement 
were met without action from the legislature, including removing gender bias language from 
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public school textbooks, making credit available to women, creating programs to train female 
workers, and extending women’s social security coverage (Montero 1997). After extensive 
debate, the final version of the bill, Law for the Promotion of Women’s Social Equality, was 
passed in 1990. Although the final law was less progressive and much less extensive than the 
original proposal, it was still considered a huge victory for women at a time when many other 
Central American nations were struggling with war and democratization rather than the plight of 
women (Montero 1997).  
     Costa Rica established national gender quotas in 2009, which require 50 percent of 
candidates to be from each gender (The Quota Project). However, the quotas do not appear to 
have made drastic changes in the gender composition of the legislature following 2009, most 
likely because the number of female legislators in Costa Rica was already well above average. 
According to Inter-Parliamentary Union data, the percentage of female lower-house legislators in 
Costa Rica grew from 19.3 percent to 38.6 percent in the period between 2000 and 2010 
("Women in Parliaments”). Costa Rica also has gender quotas at the sub-national level, and 
several political parties have adopted voluntary gender quotas (The Quota Project). 
 Despite significant legislative gains and a strong presence of women in the legislature, 
gender inequality still exists in Costa Rica, especially in the form of economic inequality 
between men and women stemming from society rooted in machismo (Montero 1997). Even 
several political and civil inequalities exist in the modern era. According to Bogliaccini’s index, 
Costa Rican women had not yet realized full equality as of 2009. Three unequal provisions 
remained: 1) Women needed the permission of a father or ex-husband to remarry, 2) In labor 
legislation, women were equated with minors, and 3) Punishment for crimes was diminished if 
the victim was a woman (Bogliaccini 2009).    
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Selected Legislative Reforms Between 2000 and 2010: 
 Similar to Argentina, Costa Rica passed large numbers of “marginal” laws and executive 
orders during the eleven-year period studied. These included multiple executive orders declaring 
national interest in things such as the International Day of Women, or in national events related 
to women’s rights issues. Many of the gender-related laws passed by the legislature were 
considered marginal because they included generic equality clauses, barring discrimination based 
on gender but also base don race, ethnicity, etc. Additionally, many laws merely outlined 
objectives for advancing women rather than actually creating programs, devoting resources, or 
developing legal provisions to improve the lives of women.  
 However, while about a third of all laws related to women’s issues were “marginal,” 
there were still 23 “meaningful” laws. Arguably the most important law passed during this time 
period was the 2007 Criminalization of Violence Against Women Act. The law was designed to 
protect the rights of victims of violence, specifically violence stemming from marriage or gender 
discrimination. Another landmark piece of legislation was Electoral Law 8765, the Costa Rican 
gender quota law, which passed in 2009 and required 50 percent of nominated candidates to be 
women in national and sub-national elections. Similarly, there were many meaningful executive 
orders passed between 2000 and 2010. For example, a series of orders developed the Law 
Against Sexual Harassment to assist the Attorney General’s office with preventing, investigating 
and punishing crimes of sexual harassment. 
   
Explaining Legislative changes: 
 The largest spike in laws related to women’s issues during this time period occurred in 
2007 — coinciding with the change in governments and the incoming Arias (PLN) 
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administration. The percentage of all laws that were related to women remained high for the 
duration of his administration and the 2010 electoral season in which another PLN candidate, 
Laura Chinchilla, won the presidency. Between 2006 and 2010 the PLN also held a majority in 
the Legislative Assembly (Álvarez-Rivera 2014). This spike is intuitive as the PLN has 
historically been the party most favorable to women. The spike in 2001 also coincides with the 
lead-up to an election year. Although the Christian-Social Unity Party (PUSC) retained power in 
both the Legislative Assembly and the presidency following the 2002 elections, it is possible that 
PUSC was attempting to appeal to women and draw female voters away from voting for PLN 
candidates. The year-to-year change in the number of executive orders was too small to draw any 
meaningful conclusions 
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Conclusions for Costa Rica: 
 In Costa Rica, leftist parties played the largest role in advancing female-centric 
legislation, rather than descriptive representation of women. Although Costa Rica has one of the 
highest percentages of female legislators in the region, the percentage of all laws that were 
related to women’s issues each year did not consistently rise along with the number of female 
legislators. Rather, the percentage rose and fell with the influence of the left-leaning PLN. 
Additionally, the amount of female-centric legislation rose leading up to election years, likely 
because members of all parties were trying to attract female voters.  
 
 
3) The Case of Female Representation in The Dominican Republic 
 
Country Background and History: 
For a case where women’s representation is in the middle of the pack, I will look at the 
case of the Dominican Republic. Between 2000 and 2001, The Dominican Republic’s percentage 
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of women in the lower legislature grew from 16.1 to 19.7, which hovers between the regional 
average for the Americas (which grew from 15.3 to 22.2 percent female) and the world average 
(which grew from 13.4 and 19.1) during this time period ("Women in Parliaments”). The 
Dominican Republic is a multi-party presidential system, where presidents are elected to 4-year 
terms. 
 
Women, Politics, and Political Parties: 
The Congreso Nacional is a bicameral legislature. There are 190 members of the House 
of Representatives, who all serve 4-year terms and are elected through proportional 
representation. The upper house consists of 32 Senators elected by simple majority vote for 4-
year terms (CIA World Factbook). In modern times, congressional seats are usually divided 
between the three major parties: the center-left Dominican Liberation Party (PLD), the social-
democratic Modern Revolutionary Party (PRM), and the right-wing Social Christian Reformist 
Party (PRSC).  
The dictatorship of Trujillo, which began in 1930 following American occupation, 
profoundly changed Dominican politics by consolidating the multi-party system into a one-party 
regime under his nationalist Dominican Party (Mayes 2008). Early on, the feminist and suffrage 
movements were backed by the nationalist Trujillo regime and elite female activists allied 
themselves with the right-wing Dominican Party (Mayes 2008). Shortly after the establishment 
of women’s suffrage in 1942, the first female parliamentarians were elected as Dominican Party 
candidates. It was not until political liberation in the late 1970s that a diversity of opinions began 
to re-emerge in the women’s movement (Flora 1984). With the reemergence of a multi-party 
system, the left-leaning Dominican Liberation Party has been the most favorable toward women 
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and women’s issues, and is the party of many prominent women in Dominican Politics. At 
present, there is no women’s caucus in the Dominican legislature, according to the Inter-
Parliamentary Union (Database on Women’s Caucuses). 
 
History of Women’s Advancement and Legislative Victories: 
The history of women in the Dominican Republic cannot be separated from its history of 
occupation and authoritarianism. Early began feminists to come together during the U.S. 
occupation lasting from 1916 to 1924 (Mayes 2008). In 1917, Dominican women organized the 
first National Women’s Congress and founded a national feminist magazine (Mayes 2008). 
During this time period, U.S. authorities, many of whom believed that hyper-traditional 
Dominican values were thwarting the nation’s economic and political development, shoved 
through a series of reforms (Derby 2009). The military government subsequently pushed for 
legislation that allowed women to manage their own earnings and set up programs to train 
women for the workforce (Derby 2009). Although changes to the civil and martial codes during 
this time period helped women to advance, they also placed Dominican women in negative light. 
Disavowing women’s advancement became synonymous with disavowing Americanization and 
U.S. imperialism (Derby 2009).   
In the period following American occupation, Dominican feminism shifted away from 
U.S. progressivism and toward the right. In 1930, activists created the Accion Dominicana 
Femenista (AFD), a women’s group that brought together feminists from several different 
ideologies, united by upper-class status and non-political goals such as educational reform, city 
beautification and women’s suffrage (Mayes 2008). At that time, eventual dictator Rafael 
Trujillo was campaigning as a presidential candidate. During his campaign he embraced 
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women’s issues and called the AFD his official women’s group, largely because the organization 
— and the broader Dominican feminist movement — was comprised of white, affluent women 
(Mayes 2008). According to Mayes, “By 1942, official feminism became a state project that 
promoted the white supremacist and modernizing vision of Trujillo and elevated the class and 
color interests of elite white women (Mayes 2008).” Trujillo’s brand of nationalism incorporated 
elite women, who were viewed as necessary for maintaining a society controlled by the white 
upper class. Motherhood was venerated, as exemplified by Trujillo’s creation of the National 
Office to Protect Maternity as well as a prize for women who raised at least eleven children 
(Mayes 2008). In 1942, the regime granted women the right to vote, which in hindsight can be 
seen as a strategic political move to bolster domestic support and to make the Trujillo regime 
appear modern in the eyes of the international community (Mayes 2008). Dominican Congress 
also reformed the civil code in 1942 to give women equal access to university education, 
freedom to choose any career, and civil equality for married women (Mayes 2008). However, 
despite civil and political reform, women had little power in the regime itself or in the eyes of the 
dictator. Numerous stories exist of Trujillo kidnapping and raping young women, and his 
mistresses were well known in Dominican society (Derby 2009).  
The influence of the elitist AFD remained strong throughout the Trujillo dictatorship, 
until his assassination in 1960 and continued into the reign of Trujillista politician Joaquín 
Balaguer until 1978 (Flora 1984). In her article on Socialist Feminism in the region, Flora 
explains the eventual rise of a leftist women’s movement in the late 1970s:  
“While the parties in power mobilized the bourgeois and some working class and peasant 
women in support of the status quo by emphasizing their traditional roles, Dominican 
leftist women fought the government side by side with their male leftist comrades. 
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Concerned with political change and social justice for the poor, these women suffered the 
same type of imprisonment that the men did (Flora 1984).” 
When leftist opposition parties were allowed to form in 1976, women ironically found 
themselves left out of the new political movement, and ramped up grassroots organization (Flora 
1984). In the late seventies, numerous women’s groups began to mobilize against male 
chauvinism and engage in consciousness-raising among poor Dominican women and the 
university community (Flora 1984). The strong grassroots movement of women was 
characterized by “a high degree of organization and social class diversity (Flora 1984).”     
  The period of democratization following the Balaguer regime was an important time for 
Dominican women, characterized by numerous piecemeal victories. The nineties were the first 
time that women’s issues were incorporated into the post-Trujillo era political parties, and that 
national politicians began to use gender-inclusive language on the campaign trail (Morgan 2008). 
A 1992 modification of the labor code outlawed workplace discrimination based on sex. In 1995, 
the Dominican Republic ratified the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment 
and Eradication of Violence against Women, and in 1997 the penal code was amended to 
criminalize sexual assault and enact longer prison sentences (OECD). The Dominican Republic’s 
first gender quota law was passed in 1997 and required that candidate lists include at least 25 
percent female candidates. In 2000, this was increased to 33 percent. However, the Dominican 
quota law only applies to the lower house. Furthermore, no political parties have enacted 
voluntary quota laws (The Quota Project). Another 1997 law established gender quotas for city 
council elections and national Chamber of Deputies elections (Morgan 2008).  
Yet according to Bogliaccini’s index, Dominican women had not yet achieved full equal 
rights by 2009 as a result of two remaining obstacles: 1) Married women needed permission 
 55 
from their husband to enter certain careers, and 2) Certain married women’s assets were 
managed by the husband (Bogliaccini 2009). In modern times, Dominican women continue to 
protest for equal pay, policies to reduce violence against women, and abortion rights for cases of 
rape, incest or when the mother’s life is at stake (BBC 2016).  
 
Selected Legislative Reforms Between 2000 and 2010: 
  In the time frame studied, most of the laws related to women emanating from the 
Dominican Chamber of Deputies were meaningful (16 laws) rather than marginal (3 laws). One 
of the most influential was a 2000 modification to the nation’s electoral quota law, which 
increased the percentage of women required on candidate lists from 25 percent to 33 percent. 
Another important piece of legislation was Ley 88-03, which was passed in 2003 to provide safe 
houses and shelters for victims of domestic violence.  
 
Explaining Legislative changes: 2 
Compared to the other nations studied for this project, the Dominican Republic’s 
legislature is highly unproductive, passing very few laws in total each year. As a result, the 
number of laws related to women’s issues was also low (16 between 2000 and 2010). Moreover, 
the legislature’s unproductivity skewed the percentage of all laws that were related to women’s 
issues, thereby making the Dominican Republic an outlier in all the regression models. In reality, 
the seemingly large spike in laws related to women in 2003 resulted from 4 laws being passed (in 
contrast to one law in the years before and after). Although the spike is most likely arbitrary, it 
                                                
2 The scale for this graph is 30 percent rather than 10 percent, as the legislature’s overall unproductivity skewed the 
percentage of all laws that were related to women’s issues.  
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could be attributed to effects following the 2002 parliamentary elections, in which the right-
leaning Dominican Liberation Party lost their majority in the legislature. 
 
 
Conclusions for The Dominican Republic: 
 The Dominican Republic presents an interesting case in female representation, stemming 
from the women’s movement’s historic ties to the extreme, nationalist dictatorship of Trujillo. 
Additionally, for the purpose of this project, the nation should be considered an outlier because 
the legislature’s overall unproductivity, i.e. tendency to pass very few laws in a given year, 
skewed the percentage of all laws that were related to women’s issues.  
Nevertheless, the influence of the left-leaning Dominican Revolutionary Party, which has 
generally been the most favorable toward women and women’s issues in modern times, should 
not be discounted as a factor in the advancement of female-centric legislation. 
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4) The Case of Female Representation in Chile 
 
Country Background and History: 
 Finally, I will look at two countries that have below average female representation in the 
Legislature, this first being Chile. Despite being one of the most advanced nations in South 
America, and the only South American member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), Chile continues to lag behind in terms of female legislators.  
Chile is a presidential republic with a multi-party electoral system. The president is 
elected for 4-year terms, which cannot be consecutive. In 2006, Chile elected its first female 
president, Michele Bachelet of the Socialist Party, who appointed a cabinet that was 50 percent 
female (Haas 2010). Between her presidential terms in 2006 and 2014, Bachelet served as the 
first executive director for the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment 
of Women.  
 
Women, Politics, and Political Parties: 
The Chilean Congreso Nacional is a bicameral legislature, with a senate comprised of 38 
members who are elected by proportional representation to 8-years terms, and a Chamber of 
Deputies comprised of 120 members who are elected through a system of list proportional 
representation to 4-year terms (CIA World Factbook). Chile has a robust multi-party system: 
according to Valenzula (1995), “Since the late nineteenth century, Chile has had a multiparty 
system, with about five or six major parties and many more (up to about twenty-five) smaller 
ones.” Typically, since 1990, parties have aligned in the legislature to form two dominant 
coalitions: the left-leaning Concertación, and the right-leaning Coalition for Change. 
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In a deviation from the norm, Chile’s Conservative party was the first to adopt women’s 
rights as part of its platform in 1918. As Lavrin explains, “Conservatives had nothing to lose and 
much to gain by courting women at a period when the emergence of popular elements in national 
politics seemed inevitable (Lavrin 1998).” The move to attract women was aided by the Catholic 
Church’s position in support of increasing women’s political rights (Lavrin 1998). It was not 
until the mid 1920s that the Radical party also called for women’s civil rights. When women 
were able to vote in local elections in the 1930s, the female vote favored right-wing parties. As a 
result, the left-leaning parties mobilized against women’s suffrage — a break from the pattern 
observed in other Latin American countries at the time.  
Despite the women’s suffrage movement’s eventual success in Chile, the effort failed to 
establish strong ties with any particular political party, thereby diminishing the long-term 
political prospects of the women’s movement as a whole (Pribble 2006). For example, the 
Aylwin administration created the National Women’s Service (Servicio Nacional de la Mujer, or 
SERNAM) in 1991, which is part of the cabinet-level Ministry of Planning and Cooperation. Yet 
because the women’s movement lacked strong ties to a particular party, SERNAM still faced 
opposition from both the left and right political coalitions. Thus, SERNAM received less 
funding, fewer staff members than expected, and was placed within another ministry rather than 
becoming an independent agency (Dosek 2017). 
The first women were elected to Chilean Congress before the Pinochet dictatorship — in 
the final election before the 1973 coup, 14 women were elected to the chamber of deputies 
(Dosek 2017). However, after the transition to democracy the number of female legislators was 
slashed in half. Throughout the nineties, the percentage of women in the lower legislature 
remained below ten percent. The decline in female representatives seems counterintuitive 
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because the Chilean women’s movement grew and unified during the dictatorship, in part 
because they shared the common goal of ousting Pinochet and ending the social, political and 
economic setbacks created by the dictatorship (Franceschet 2005). However, the decline in 
women’s representation also coincided with the re-strengthening of parties. The parties attempt 
to control and reorganize the women’s groups that developed and united autonomously resulted 
in new divisions (Franceschet 2005). Women’s organizations were suddenly dragged down by 
partisan conflicts that did not exist before and during the dictatorship (Franceschet 2005). In the 
post transition era, women also disagreed about how much to engage in formal politics and 
political parties, which could have led to some of the decline in representation. According to 
Franceschet, “(Some) women believed that party militancy was key, and that there was no 
problem with participating in the parties as feminists. Yet other women wanted to avoid politics 
altogether…For these women, formal politics was an arena irrelevant to their daily problems, 
largely because partisan actors traditionally ignored (the socio-economic problems they 
experienced as women) (Franceschet 2005).”    
Chile is one of the few South American countries with no national gender quota law. 
There are voluntary quota policies adopted by political parties. The left-leaning Party for 
Democracy and Socialist Party both have rules stating that neither gender can be represented on 
the electoral lists by more than 60 percent. However, these voluntary quotas are not strictly 
enforced (Ríos Tobar 2008, The Quota Project). Scholars have identified political parties as the 
greatest barrier to women’s representation in Chile (Franceschet 2005). The parties obstruct 
women by maintaining a culture of “machista” and male-dominance, by refusing to enact or 
enforce party quota laws, and by monopolizing the electoral process, thereby “undermining any 
attempts by women who want to participate in the political process independently of partisan 
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organizations (Franceschet 2005).”  Moreover, political parties face little pressure to take on 
women’s issues as a result of a weak women’s movement and divisions between female 
legislators (Franceschet 2005).  
 
History of Women’s Advancement and Legislative Victories: 
Historically, Chile has lagged behind in women’s rights advancement. In other Latin 
American nations, cross-class feminist movements began in the late nineteenth century. 
However, Chile did not develop a middle-class feminist movement until the 1910s, and lower 
class feminists remained more concerned about economic issues than issues of civil rights 
(Lavrin 1998). Early movements to reform the civil code in Chile were conservative and 
restrained — they championed single women’s equality, but retained a male-dominated power 
structure in marriage (Lavrin 1998). In the 1920s, the conversation surrounding women’s rights 
began to shift toward equal civil rights and modernity (Lavrin 1998). The mid-1920s proved to 
be a turning point in the Chilean women’s rights movement. The country’s most prominent 
feminist group, Partido Cívico Femenino, took a stronger position on civil and political rights, 
conservative women’s groups demanded a “more active role” for women in society, and the 
Catholic church backed women’s right to work (Lavrin 1998). In 1925, a shallow reform of the 
civil code was adopted by the January Junta, which allowed women to enter into any career and 
to have control over their own earnings, provided that their husband did not object (Lavrin 
1998). Activists did not consider the 1925 reform sufficient, and a commission formed at the 
University of Chile law school to make recommendations for further revisions which included 
separate property rights for husbands and wives, and shared custody (Lavrin 1998). The 
revisions were sent to Congress following Arturo Alessandria Palma’s return to the presidency, 
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and with his backing, they passed unanimously in the Chamber of Deputies without a debate 
(Lavrin 1998). 
Similar to the slow-going movement for civil code reform, the women’s suffrage 
movement in Chile moved at a glacial pace. According to Pernet, the slow pace of the women’s 
movement can be attributed to two factors 1) Chilean women were not pressed to demand their 
rights because their economic and social situations were not dire, and 2) the impact of women’s 
suffrage was frequently called into question by groups ambivalent toward women’s political 
rights (Pernet 2000). The path to suffrage took multiple stages and a great deal of political 
maneuvering from parties attempting to lobby female voters or discourage them entirely. 
Suffrage was first enacted in local elections in 1934 before being expanded to all elections in 
1949 (Lopez 2015). In a deviation from the norm, Chilean women voting in municipal elections 
in 1935 and 1938 were found to be more conservative than their male counterparts, prompting 
the left-leaning parties to attempt to block women’s suffrage at the national level (Pernet 2000). 
Chilean women’s final path to suffrage was aided by an international push. Chilean feminists 
were heavily engaged on the international and Pan-American levels, with involvement in the 
Inter-American Commission of Women (IACW) and the Women’s International League for 
Peace and Freedom. When a national women’s suffrage bill was introduced in 1945, these 
international organizations, as well as women’s groups in the United States, helped to lobby 
Chilean congress (Pernet 2000). Even still, the bill was buried until it was finally passed three 
years later (Pernet 2000).  
In modern times, the National Women’s Service has helped pass numerous laws and 
orders promoting gender equality. However, Chilean women have still struggled to achieve full 
equality. According to Bogliaccini’s index, Chilean women still faced two hurdles to full 
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equality as of 2009: 1) Certain married women’s assets were managed by the husband and 2) 
Mothers did not have equal patria potestad, or custody rights, over children (Bogliaccini 2009). 
Additionally, divorce remained illegal in Chile until 2004. Moreover, the Chilean welfare state 
benefits men more than women, and continues to reinforce traditional gender roles. 
Impoverished men are eligible to receive a family allowance if they have a dependent wife; 
however, women are only eligible for the entitlement if their husbands are disabled (Pribble 
2006). Today, the nation is often considered the most conservative society in South America, in 
part because of the increased salience of the Catholic Church in the post-dictatorship era. 
According to Blofield and Haas, in post-Pinochet Chile, “both religious and class-based 
opposition to reform is strong (Blofield 2005).” 
  
Selected Legislative Reforms Between 2000 and 2010: 
 During this time, Chile passed many more “meaningful” laws than “marginal” laws. By 
far the most discussed gender-related law passed during the time period studied was Chile’s 2004 
divorce law (Ley 19.947), which was viewed as a step away from the Catholic church and the 
nation’s conservative history. A sexual education law passed in 2010 was also seen as defiant 
toward the church — Ley 20.418 declared that all Chileans, especially adolescents, have the 
right to receive unbiased education regarding contraception, pregnancy, STIs and sexual 
violence. The law also allowed public and private health centers to distribute emergency 
contraceptives to both adults and teenagers, without the need for parental consent. 
 Another important advancement for women included Ley 19.874, which was passed in 
2003 to facilitate better investigations of sexual assault crimes. During this time period, Chile 
also began to incorporate gender-equalizing language or initiatives into seemingly unrelated 
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bills. For example, Ley 20.433, called the law to “Creation of Citizen Community Broadcasting 
Services,” includes a provision for groups of women to be granted access to community 
broadcasting in order to promote their “sexual and reproductive rights.” 
 Although there were only three gender-related executive orders passed during the time 
period studied, they too accomplished meaningful advancements in the structure of the 
government. For example, a 2010 order enacted during the presidency of Sebastian Piñera called 
for the creation of a presidential advisory committee on “Women, Work and Maternity.” 
 
Explaining Legislative changes: 
 During this time, Chile passed many more “meaningful” laws than “marginal” gender-
related laws. The large spike in legislation in 2005 coincides with the final year or the Lagos 
presidency. The increase in gender-related legislation could be seen as an attempt by the center-
left administration to court female voters leading up to an election between two female 
Presidential candidates. Additionally, the progressive Lagos administration was generally 
favorable toward women throughout his presidency — Lagos directly led to the political rise of 
Michelle Bachelet. Lagos appointed Bachelet as Minister of Health in 2000, and later as Minister 
of Defense, making her the first woman to hold this position in any Latin American nation (Ortiz 
de Zárate 2017). The next gradual rise in laws related to women’s issues occurred during 
Bachelet’s first presidency (2006-2010).  
 Additionally, the National Women’s Service (SERNAM) was active throughout the 2000 
to 2010 time period. It is possible that the leadership of Cecilia Pérez Díaz, an independent, 
during the second half of the Lagos administration allowed SERNAM to avoid engaging in 
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partisan politics, and allowed the service to accomplish more for women. By contrast, Bachelet 
appointed a Christian Democrat and a Socialist to lead SERNAM during her administration.   
There were only three executive orders related to women’s issues that passed during the 
time period studied. Although this is too small a number to yield many meaningful conclusions, 
it should be noted that all three were passed during presidential transitions. Michelle Bachelet 
assumed the presidency in March 2006. Meanwhile one of the executive orders related to women 
was passed in the last months of the Lagos administration and another passed in the first months 
of the Bachelet administration. The last of the executive orders related to women’s issues was 
passed in the first months of the Piñera administration. 
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Conclusions for Chile: 
 In Chile, the strength of leftist parties that make up the left-leaning Concertación 
coalition, and theses parties’ willingness to advance women’s issues, played the largest role in 
passing female-centric legislation. Despite Chile’s history as both an intensely conservative and 
Catholic nation, the leftist party coalition was still able to advance meaningful legislation for 
women. The election of Michelle Bachelet, who could be considered a leftist, pro-feminist 
president, also aided the passage of legislation related to women’s issues. Overall, party politics 
as well as the ideology and party affiliation of the president played a larger role in advancing 
women-centric legislation than descriptive representation of women in the legislature.  
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5) The Case of Female Representation in Uruguay 
 Country Background and History:  
For the final case study, I will look at female representation in Uruguay. Similar to Chile, 
Uruguay has historically experienced low female representation in the legislature. In 2000, the 
nation began with 12.1 percent women in the lower house of the legislature, which at the time 
was hovering just below the world average of 13.4. However, in the eleven-year period studied 
in this paper, Uruguay’s percentage of female legislators grew to only 15.2, falling even further 
behind the world average of 19.1 percent women and the regional average of 22.2 percent 
women in 2010 ("Women in Parliaments”). In the years following the civil-military dictatorship 
that ended in1985, Uruguay has been regarded as a stable democracy. The president is directly 
elected to a 5-year term, and is eligible for more non-consecutive terms. The president appoints 
the cabinet, but appointments must be approved by the legislature. Uruguay has never had a 
female president. Gender quota laws were not introduced in Uruguay until after the time period 
studied for this project (2014), which likely contributes to the nation’s low percentages of 
women in the legislature. However, Uruguay is an interesting case for analysis of women in 
government because despite the nation’s low percentage of women in the legislature, it is 
generally considered a leader in women’s rights in the region.  
 
Women, Politics, and Political Parties: 
The Uruguayan Asamblea General is bicameral, consisting of a 31 seat Chamber of 
Senators and a 99 seat Chamber of Representatives. Members of both houses are elected by 
proportional representation for 5-year terms (CIA World Factbook). The first women were 
elected to Uruguayan congress in 1942 — two senators from the Colorado party, one deputy 
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from the Colorado party and one deputy from the communist party. The election of these women 
directly led to the end of the feminist battle for civil code reform, as the female representatives 
introduced much of the civil code reform legislation (Lavrin 1998).  
Since the 1970s, Uruguay has had three dominant, stable political parties: The National 
Party, a right-wing conservative party; the Colorado Party, a party uniting moderate and liberal 
groups with a traditionally liberal urban base; and The Broad Front, a coalition of center-left 
parties including Christian Democrats, socialists, and communists. Prior to the 1970s, the 
National Party and the Colorado Party dominated politics — the Colorados were the center-left 
party and moved to their present-day position as a center or center right party during the military 
dictatorship. Female representatives have been elected from all major parties. In his paper on 
electoral reform in Uruguay, Cason argues that the once-stable three party system has moved 
toward a stronger voting bloc on the left (Cason 2002).  
Despite party differences, female legislators came together in March 2000 to declare the 
creation of a bicameral women’s caucus, which they named the Bancada Femenina, or “female 
bench.” The caucus was originally comprised of eight women from the leftist Broad Front, four 
women from the liberal Colorado Party and three women from the conservative National Party. 
The momentum of the women’s caucus stemmed from several female MPs who were reelected 
in 1999 and had already spent a term in Parliament attempting to promote gender issues, but with 
no success (Johnson 2016). Although this coalition of women did not support the same political 
ideologies, they agreed that women’s issues ought to be discussed. As one female representative 
stated, “We were more interested in ensuring the debate took place than the outcome (Johnson 
2016).” To ensure the institutional legitimacy of their informal caucus, the Bancada Femenina 
was instrumental in passing a law to create a Special Committee on Gender and Equity in March 
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2000 (Johnson 2016). Between 2000 and 2010, the women’s caucus was able to successfully 
sponsor 29 bills related to gender issues, frequently partnering with male representatives to 
overcome their minority status in the legislature (Johnson 2016). In a 2008 survey of gender and 
parliamentary priorities conducted by the Inter-Parliamentary Union, one male parliamentarian 
in Uruguay wrote, “As a rule, men and women have the same political outlook and priorities. 
However, women and men politicians attach priority to different topics (women politicians give 
priority to subjects more closely related to the women themselves)” (Ballington 2008). The 
influence of the women’s caucus decreased following the 2009 elections, most likely because 
none of the original founders remain in the legislature (Johnson 2016). Today, women from all 
major political parties still engage in dialogue regarding how to increase representation of 
women in the legislature and their influence in political parties (“Young Uruguayan Women”).    
 
History of Women’s Advancement and Legislative Victories: 
The Uruguayan women’s movement took root in the early 1900s, coinciding with the 
nation’s early progression of urban development and secularization (Pousadela 2016). As early 
as 1914, Uruguayan legislators began to challenge the civil code that heavily restricted the rights 
of married women and women under the age of eighteen (Lavrin 1998). Colorado representative 
Héctor Miranda put a bill forth in July 1914 calling for the recognition of women’s civil rights, 
and more importantly for the Colorado party, women’s political rights. However, Miranda’s 
death in 1915 essentially killed the bill before it was even discussed (Lavrin 1998). But the fight 
for women’s advancement continued, first with small victories and eventually with sweeping 
reforms. In 1932, Uruguay became one of the first Latin American nations to allow all women to 
vote and to stand for election (Lavrin 1998). By the late 1930s Uruguay was home to a feminist 
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political party as well as a slew of feminist organizations. In December 1938, the legislature 
approved a bill that reformed the civil code to allow women to enter any career, administer their 
own incomes, and above all, allow women who were married, widowed or divorced to have full 
legal capacity. However, the reform largely left married women with severely limited rights 
(Lavrin 1998).  
The first women were elected to congress in 1942, and female deputy Magdalena 
Antonelli Moreno of the Colorado party introduced the bill that would end married women’s 
fight for civil equality (Beck 2011, Lavrin 1998). Uruguay succeeded in fulfilling complete equal 
civil rights for women in 1946 with the passage of Moreno’s law (Ley 10.783). The law 
reformed the Uruguayan Civil Code to include sweeping gender equality regulations, largely 
focused on ending restrictions placed on married women — the law was rooted in the feminist 
opinions of former president Baltasar Brum and the modern idea of democracy within the family 
(Lavrin 1998). According to Lavrin’s book on women, feminism and social change in the region, 
“[The 1946 Uruguayan reform] had behind it the finest philosophical argument for female 
equality before the law was enhanced by the introduction of the concept of democracy. It came 
closest to fulfilling the hope of early twentieth century feminists.” 
The sexual revolution in the 1960s allowed more women to engage in family planning, 
and therefore led to increased numbers of women in universities and later, increased numbers of 
women the workforce (Pousadela 2016). During the authoritarian military dictatorship between 
1973 and 1985, new women’s organizations were founded, and were closely intertwined with the 
larger social movement to end state terrorism and human rights abuses (Pousadela 2016). As a 
result, the women’s movement grew and diversified in the years following the dictatorship 
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(Pousadela 2016). However, despite the heavy involvement of women’s groups in bringing the 
return to democracy, no female legislators were elected in the 1984 election. 
In modern times, the Uruguayan women’s movement shifted its focus toward issues of 
gender equality, representation and issues of reproductive rights in the context of human rights 
(Pousadela 2016). In these areas, the Uruguayans women’s movement has led successful 
campaigns. In 2009, Uruguay passed a gender quota rule requiring women to appear in at least 
one in three slots on each candidate list. However, this rule was not implemented nationally until 
the 2014 elections. There are gender quotas in place for election in some sub-national 
departments, and one political party, The Socialist Party of Uruguay, has voluntarily adopted a 
weak gender quota law. According to Bogliaccini’s index, Uruguay is the only case study 
country that had no unequal rights provisions remaining as of 2009 (Bogliaccini 2009). In 2012 
(outside the scope of this research project), Uruguay legalized abortion despite qualms from both 
left and right-leaning party leaders (Pousadela 2016), thus ending one of the longstanding battles 
of the women’s caucus.     
 
Selected Legislative Reforms Between 2000 and 2010  
Several laws from the 2000 to 2010 period stand out for their meaningful impacts on the 
lives of Uruguayan women. The first was a domestic violence law passed in 2002 (Ley N. 
17.514), which declared the prevention and eradication of domestic violence of public interest. 
This was followed by another key law (Ley N. 17.707) in 2003, which was backed by the 
women’s caucus, providing restraining orders in all domestic violence cases. In 2008, the 
passage of Ley N. 18.426 called for the promotion of national policies on sexual and 
reproductive health. This entailed ensuring universal access to safe contraception methods, 
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promoting maternal health and assistance for pregnant women, and much more. Another related 
law engineered by the women’s caucus gave all women the right to take the day off work for 
their annual gynecological exams (Castellenos 2006). 
 
Explaining Legislative Changes: 
 The increases and decreases in legislation pertaining to women’s issues from year to year 
do not directly coincide with the percentage of women in the legislature. However, most of the 
gender legislation can be attributed to the dealings of the women’s caucus, which was formed in 
2000 and did not experience a decline in activity until 2009. As previously discussed, the 
percentage of women in Uruguay’s Asamblea General was too small for female representatives 
to accomplish much on their own during this time, and much of the women’s caucus legislative 
success can be attributed to their effective coalitions with male members of the legislature and 
across party lines. However, it should also be noted that with so few women, female legislators 
still faced pressures to vote with party rather than the women’s caucus, thereby limiting the 
ability of the caucus to pass large numbers of women-centric legislation (Barnes 2016). The 
slight increase in the amount of gender legislation in 2007 and 2008 could be attributed to effects 
of the upcoming 2009 election — several of the original members of the women’s caucus did not 
run for reelection, and therefore most likely made a final push to introduce women-centric bills. 
 The slight increase could also be attributed to the Broad Front (Frente Amplio) gaining 
power in 2005. The coalition of leftist parties, which has a good record of advancing women’s 
rights, won 16 out of 30 seats in the senate, 52 out of 99 seats in the chamber of deputies, and the 
presidency (“Elecciones Nacionales”). The administration of Broad Front socialist Tabaré 
Vázquez helped promote women in government by appointing women to four out of 13 minister 
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positions during his 2005 to 2010 administration (Green 2012). What is more, the minister 
appointments placed women at the head of two traditionally male-dominated departments, the 
ministry of defense and the ministry of the interior. 
 
 
Conclusions for Uruguay: 
 In Uruguay, a strong women’s caucus had the biggest influence on female-centric 
legislation. The women’s caucus can be seen as an extension of the women’s movement as a 
whole — female legislators of different parties came together to advance a broad agenda of 
women’s issues. The women’s movement has helped determine the priorities of feminist 
organizing, and the women’s caucus has helped translate those priorities into meaningful 
legislative reform. Overall, the willingness of female legislators to work together proved much 
more important than the percentage of women in the legislature. Furthermore, the Broad Front 
coalition of leftist parties also supported the advancement of women-centric legislation. As a 
result, the Uruguayan legislature was able to pass several important laws related to women’s 
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issues between 2000 and 2010 despite having one of the region’s smallest percentages of women 
in the legislature.  
 
Chapter Six: Conclusion 
Through a combination of quantitative and qualitative data, I find little concrete support 
that women’s presence in a legislature alone makes a substantial difference for the passage of 
meaningful legislation related to women’s issues. Often, the success of female representatives in 
championing female causes depends on what allies or other institutions, if any, they can rely on 
for support in the government. Case study analysis leads to the conclusion that other mechanisms 
— largely leftist political parties, well-supported and progressive government agencies focused 
on women’s affairs, and women’s movements and caucuses — greatly affect the number of laws 
that are passed surrounding women’s issues. Moreover, the amount of legislation regarding 
women’s issues may be greatly influenced by a government’s preoccupation with other issues, 
such as an economic crisis, by partisan gridlock paralyzing the legislature, or by election 
campaigns attempting to appeal to female voters. 
As previously stated, the largest takeaway from individual case study analysis of the 
effects of female representation is that no cross-country generalization is possible — the number 
of laws and executive orders related to women’s issues depends very much on the context of 
each country during the given year. In Argentina, the nation with the highest female 
representation, the early adoption of quota laws and the cross-party alliance of women have 
allowed women to enter the legislature and subsequently work toward advancing women’s 
rights. However, even with near gender parity in the Argentine legislature, factors unrelated to 
descriptive representation, such as an economic crisis, could hinder legislation related to 
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women’s issues, or prompt an increase in easier-to-pass marginal laws. Meanwhile in Uruguay, 
the nation with the lowest percentage of women in the legislature, a strong women’s caucus and 
support from the Frente Amplio, a leftist party that consistently pushed for women’s rights, 
allows women to pass gender-focused laws that are meaningful despite a lack of descriptive 
representation for women. In Costa Rica and Chile, party politics and the strength of the social 
democratic, leftist party arguably played the largest role in the advancement of women’s issues. 
Additionally, as seen in the case of Chile, a pro-feminist female leader most likely led to the 
increase in laws related to women’s issues. Finally, in the case of the Dominican Republic, an 
unproductive legislature hinders all political productivity — not just legislation related to 
women’s issues. Aside from an unproductive legislature, the lack of a women’s caucus may also 
encumber female legislators’ ability to pass legislation related to women’s issues. Clearly, there 
is no one mechanism that impacts the amount of legislation passed related to women’s issues. 
And conversely, simply electing female representatives does not automatically bolster the 
amount of pro-female laws that are passed. Ultimately, descriptive representation may not be 
vital for advancing women’s interests through legislation. 
 
Future Research 
Considering the lack of data on legislation proposed by female legislators, or on 
legislation proposed but not passed by the legislature, I cannot prove the following speculations 
with empirical data. Even still, I speculate that having more women in Latin American 
legislatures does increase the extent to which women’s issues are brought up or discussed, and 
that despite the minimal impacts of descriptive representation, there are still links between 
descriptive and substantive representation.  
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It is possible that women in legislatures do act as substantive representatives for women, 
and put pressure on other legislators for more activity surrounding women’s rights and gender 
equality. However, without a large enough mass of female legislators, most proposals for reform 
or progress regarding women’s issues do not pass or even receive a vote. What female legislators 
are able to propose and pass is less significant, symbolic legislation pertaining to women. More 
in-depth research is needed to determine if female legislators are in fact engaging in “critical 
acts,” even if their acts are unsuccessful. Further research could be conducted to determine the 
number of bills that female legislators introduce related to women’s issues, and the number of 
pro-women bills that fail before reaching a vote. Additionally, further qualitative research could 
be done to determine the extent to which female legislators feel marginalized within the 
legislature, or feel they must shy away from focusing their legislative aims solely on women’s 
issues, as well as the extent to which they feel compelled to substantively represent other 
women. Overall, more research is required to determine a firm link between descriptive and 
substantive representation in Latin America.        
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